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Creative Ventures, LLC v Jim Ward & Assocs. (2011) 195 CA4th 1430, 
___ CR3d 
Mortgage company lacking real estate brokers license committed usury by 
arranging loans with combined interest rate and broker’s fee totaling more than 10 
percent. Individual investors providing financing were assignees and not holders in 
due course and thus also were liable for violation of usury laws. 
 
Licensed real estate broker (Ward) had retired and his mortgage business had merged out 
of existence. Coming out of retirement, Ward renewed his license on April 19, 1999. In 
August 2000, Ward formed a mortgage lender and loan processing company. Developers 
sought loans for two projects from that company, which they mistakenly believed was a 
licensed mortgage lender. The parties executed two promissory notes, two deeds of trust, 
and a construction loan on October 8, 2003. Each of the loans set an interest rate and 
broker’s fee totaling more than 10 percent. Ward’s company sought and secured 
independent investors to provide the financing. These investors generally received 
interest payments in amounts of 8 to 10 percent. Before the documents were executed, on 
October 1, 2003, the company president and legal counsel had been told that the company 
did not have a valid real estate license and that the Department of Real Estate (DRE) was 
investigating Ward in a disciplinary action. When the developers learned about the 
investigation, they filed suit for usury, breach of contract, and fraud against the company 
and for usury against the investors. The trial court found the company had committed 
usury and fraud, but held that the investors were holders in due course and took their 
partial interests free of the developers’ defense of usury. The court of appeal affirmed in 
part and reversed in part. Under Cal Const art XV, §1, the maximum rate lenders can 
charge on nonpersonal loans is “the higher of 10 percent or 5 percent plus the Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s rate on the 25th day of the month preceding the date the 
agreement was contracted.” Stoneridge Parkway Partners, LLC v MW Hous. Partners III, 
L.P. (2007) 153 CA4th 1373, 1379, 64 CR3d 61, reported at 30 CEB RPLR 190 (Nov. 
2007). Here, the parties stipulated to a permissible maximum rate of 10 percent unless a 
usury law exemption applied. The company argued that Cal Const art XV, §1 provided 
one such exemption because a licensed real estate broker (Ward) arranged the loans, 
which were secured by a real property lien. But the promissory notes reflected the 
company as the licensed broker and evidence showed that the parties believed and 
intended that the company would arrange the loans. Company employees involved in the 
loan transactions mistakenly believed that the company was licensed. Fatally, the 
company was not so licensed, and a prominent employee had been warned 7 days before 
document execution that this likely was the case. Thus, the trial court properly held that 
the company had violated usury laws and that the interest terms were null and void. The 
court of appeal reversed the judgment in favor of individual investors. The investors were 
not holders in due course (who take their interest free of all defenses), but rather were 
merely assignees. Notably, the promissory notes were payable to the company and 
physically in the company’s possession. A partial assignee cannot be a holder in due 
course. The investors’ rights were derivative and subject to all equities and defenses 
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existing in favor of the company. When the trial court held the interest terms null and 
void, the investors had no right to interest in any amount. 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: These investors lost the interest they should have earned 
because (1) their loan broker’s lack of a license made their notes usurious and (2) they 
were assignees rather than holders in due course of those notes. Obviously, the loan 
broker should have kept his license current, and—equally obviously—he should be liable 
to the investors for their losses caused by his failure to have done so. (A separate question 
is whether he has any funds left to pay them.) But note that even with the promissory 
notes being usurious, the investors could have recovered on them had they been held to 
be holders in due course rather than merely assignees. Holders in due course take free of 
many defenses—usury being merely one of them—that assignees take subject to. 
Investors in loans—especially those made by small and semi-amateur loan brokers—are 
clearly better off when they can qualify for holder-in-due-course status with the immunity 
that it gives them against their loan broker’s mistakes and conduct. Indeed, the loan 
brokers themselves would be safer, because their risk of having to indemnify their 
investors for losses would be much reduced by those investors having holder-in-due-
course protection. The obstacles that stand in the way of restructuring loan participations 
like this one (to give investors holder-in-due-course status) are that the loan broker 
usually holds onto the note rather than physically transferring it to the investors, and that 
the investors usually buy only partial rather than entire interests in the notes they invest 
in. But the secondary market solved those difficulties long ago through the creation of 
special-purpose vehicles (SPVs) as intermediate transferees, with those SPVs then 
issuing the fractional interests in their assets to the investors. Would it be too difficult to 
come up with a similar arrangement in this minuscule counterpart of that gigantic 
secondary market? (And it would be even easier to avoid using MERS as the 
intermediary!)—Roger Bernhardt 
 
